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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK H. RYAN and EMMA JEAN * 
RYAN, husband and wife, 
* 
* 
Respondents, 
* Case No. 16843 
* 
vs. * 
* 
J. ELLIOT EARL, 
* 
* 
Appellant * 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an equitable action initiated by the Respondent 
seeking specific performance of an alleged oral contract 
for the purchase of land and counter claim by Appellant 
for partition. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Lower Court found for the Respondent and awarded 
specific performance under the alleged oral contract, and 
did not rule on the counter claim for partition as a result 
of the grant of specific performance. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
Lower Court, and an order remanding the case to District 
Court for hearing Appellant's claim for partition. 
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ISSUES 
1. The evidence fails to establish as a matter of 
fact and law, a contract between· the parties for the sale 
and purchase of real property. 
2. Assuming an oral contract did exist, there was 
insufficient performance to exempt it from the Utah Statute 
of Frauds. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. J. Elliot.Earl, Appellant and hereinafter called 
Earl, and Anthon B. Haney, Jr., were co-tenants of the 
subject real property of this action. Each had an 
undivided one-half interest therein (TR pp 35) and upon 
which Earl in 1966 had constructed a cinder block building. 
(TR pp 37-38, 54 and 57) 
2. In December, 1977 Respondent, Jack Ryan, 
hereinafter called Ryan, offered to purchase from Appellant 
Earl, the subject property for $55,000.00 (TR pp 108-109) 
and tendered a check to Earl in the sum of $5,000.00 
(TR pp 39-41, 55, 5 T, 109) as a "good faith" check. 
The check was not cashed nor accepted as payment (TR 
pp 162, 179 and 180). 
3. Ryan desired to buy and construct a house on 
the subject land and persisted in his efforts to purchase 
it making several offers during the period of July to 
September, 1977. Earl, however, rejected each offer 
(TR PP 41; 49-52, 62-63, 84, 220, 228, 231, 234, 243, 245). 
-2-
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4. As a result of Ryan's persistent desire to build 
a home on the property, Earl suggested and consented to 
Ryan's purchase of Mr. Haney's one-half interest (TR pp 48-
49, 167, 237). Earl also suggested that upon his purchase 
of the Haneys interes~ that Earl and Ryan should enter 
into a written agreement identify each party's interest 
in the property and specifying the condition upon which 
the property would be petitioned or segregated (TR pp 167, 
242-248). 
5. On September 23, 1977, Ryan purchased Haney's 
undivided one-half interest in the land for the sum of 
$27,500.00 thus becoming a co-tenant with Earl (TR pp 216). 
6. On September 30, 1977, Ryan renewed his offer 
to purchase Earl's one-half interest in the property 
(TR pp 169-172). Earl did not accept the ·offer (TR pp 162). 
However, they conversed about the possibility of purchase 
and-Ryan gave Earl, in exchange for the original check 
issued July, 1977 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) a check in a 
similar amount of $5,000.00 dated September 30, 1977 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) and asked him to retain the same as 
a "good faith" check (TR pp 63, 221, 234). Ryan's new offer to 
purchase was in the sum of $28,500.00 payable as follows: 
$5,000.00 down, payment of an additional 
$12,761.90 in the form of a mortgage payoff which 
Earl had incurred against the Building on said 
property, leaving a remaining balance of $10,7j8.10. 
-3-
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Ryan was again instructed by Earl that he had 
no intention of selling his one-half interest in the 
property; that it was-not for sale; but in order to appease 
him Earl held the check (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) and placed 
the same in the desk drawer; but never negotiated it 
(TR pp 172, 233, 245-246). 
7. With neither the knowledge or authorization from 
Earl, Ryan paid off the mortgage against the sujbect property 
on November 15, 1977 (TR pp 231, 240). 
8. On or about the 10th day of December, 1977 
Ryan issued a check in the amount of $9,587.01 (Elaintiff's 
Exhibit 4) made-'..:payable to Earl and left the same at 
Earl's place of business (TR pp 130-131, 232). Earl did 
not discover the existence of said check for over one 
year later, in February, 1-9 7 9 (T-R pp 2 3 2) • 
9. The check for $5,000.00 issued September 30, 1977 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit .3) which was given in exchange for 
the $5,000.00 check issued July 1977 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
2) was also·voided··,by Ryan (TR pp 172.) See Defendant's 
Exhibit 27.· None of the checks were ever cashed or ne-
·,goti.ated, ·and all were returned to Ryan (TR pp 233, 245-246). 
10. Earl never accepted Ryan's offer:. to purchase 
and consistently requested that th.e parties·. enter into a 
written agreement defining their.' respective rights and 
interests as co-tenants (TR pp 244-245). 
-4-
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11. No written contract now exists or ever was 
entered into by the parties for the sale or purchase of 
said property (TR pp 243-244). 
12. From January 1978 to January 1979, Earl became 
aware of·Zimprovements made by Ryan to subject property and 
on numerous" occasions:' requested that the_~~parti_es enter 
into a written agreement-• identifying their respective 
co-tenant interests (TR pp 237, 243-244). 
ARGUMENT AND LAW 
PART I: EXISTANCE OF CONTRACT. 
1. Respondent Ryan's Complaint alleges the-
existance·-; of an--_ o-ral contract for the -- purchase- and sale 
of Appellant<Rarl' s interest in the~- subject property. 
Respondent must prove by clear and convincing evidence,_ 
a definite agreement existed between the parties. 
It is essential that the parole agreement or 
gift should be established by clear, unequivocal, 
and definite testimony, and the facts claimed to_ 
be done thereunder should be equally clear and 
definite and referrable exclusively to the con-
tract or gift. Ravarino v. Price,123 Utah559 , 
26 P2d 570 -(1953); See also 73 AmJur' 2nd 401. 
(Emphasis added) 
Th~·Plaintiff in declaring specific performance of 
_r~ an oral contract must -establish the terms thereof 
with a greater degree of certainty than is required 
in an action at law, and he must show a,clear 
mutual understanding and a positive agreement 
of both parties, to the terms of the contract. 
Chrrs:Eensen v. Christensen 9 Utah 102, 339 P2d 
101 (1959) (citing other Utah authorities, 
Emphasis added). 
-5-
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2. There is no dispute that Ryan made several 
offers to purchase Earl's interest in the property. The 
evidence, however, can only support a finding that all 
such offers were rejected. There exists no written agree-
ment and Ryan's complaint alleged oral contract which is 
denied by Earl. It does little-good to argue between the 
parties as to what was said and not said, hence the whole 
rational behind the Statute of Frauds. A review of the 
facts fails to establish any conduct of the partie·s which 
could be construed as constituting an acceptance· 
thereby creating a contract. The facts simply state the 
following: 
a) None of the checks issued were ever 
negotiated. On the contrary, all were returned 
to the Respondent. 
b) Both checks for $5,000.00 (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 
2 and 3) were voided by Ryan and written on insuff icien1 nr 
funds account even had the checks been negoiated 
(TR pp 172, 181-182; Defendant's Exhibit 27). 
c) Respondent was at all times aware that the ~a 
checks were not negotiated and made periodic inquires 
as to whether they would be negotiated (TR pp 94, 
179-180, 245-256). 
d) Appellant Earl paid the taxes on the property 
each year (TR pp 234-235; Defendant's Exhibit 23). 
e) The parties continued to use the premises 
jointly as co-tenants (TR pp 150, 153, 178, 238-240). 
-6-
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f) No deed or contract of conveyance was ever 
executed (TR pp 243-244). 
g) Earl consistently refused to sell and 
requested that the parties sign an agreement defining 
their rights as.co-tenants of the property (TR pp 41 
49-51, 62-63, 84, 162, 220, 237, 243-245). 
3. In viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the Respondent Ryan, as to the existance of an oral con-
tr~ct for sale of land, all we have is a desire on his part 
to buy the property; .many inquires; the.purchase of the co-
tenant interest; the leaving of $5,000.00 "good faith" check; 
the replacement of thereof· by another for the same and three 
months later; the voiding of·· both; the unknown delivery of 
another check (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) for a thousand dollars 
less than the alleged contract price (TR ~p 232) and the 
discovery, a year later, of the same; the unauthorized and 
undiscovered payment of a mortgage; and finally.a demand for 
a deed. 
4. Not one fact lends itself to an acceptance by 
Earl of_ Ryan's over-bearing and irrational efforts to buy 
the land·~ Ryan's acts amount only to his determination 
to·-·buy the land; ·his· pushing onto Earl·-unwanted, unnegotiated, 
and unknown checks; an unauthorized mortgage payoff; and 
finally more than a year later, a demand for delivery of a 
deed. 
5. The only benefit that could· be construed to be 
consideration given to Earl is the payment of the mortgage 
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which payment was neither authorized by nor known to Earl. 
/' 
6. It is encurnl::fant upon Ryan to prove the existance 
of the alleged oral contract to be firm, definate, certain 
and unambiguous in order to have specific performance and 
sufficient performance as to remove it from being barred the 
Statute of Frauds. Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended) Hargreaves .v. Burton, 59 Utah 575, 206 P 262 
(1922). Price v. Lloyd 31 Utah 83, 86 p-,767 ~1980}; Randall v. 
Tracy Collin Trust Company, 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P2d 480 
(1956); Ravarino v. Price, supra; Christensen v. Christensen 
supra. 
7. The problem of part performance will be discussed 
in the following section, but before part performance even 
need be considered, the Respondent needs to prove with 
clear and convincing evidence the existance of the alleged 
oral contract, the term of which need be clear, definate, 
referrable and exclusive. Ravarino v. Price, supra. 
8. In the alleged oral contract in question, the 
Court was shown no evidence except offers unaccepted, checks 
unaccepted, uncashed, unknown, wrong amount, payments 
unknown and unauthorized, no closing date, no agreed 
method of payment, no change in the payment of taxes, and no 
date of possessiqn, except_ those coincident'~Wi th co-
tenancy (TR pp 104). 
9. The fact that, though Ryan maintains he had an 
agreement, nowhere in the 255 pages of trial transcript 
is there clear, definate, unequivocal testimony as to the 
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terms of the alleged contract. The minimum requirements 
to establish a contract must be price, dates of payments, 
closing, and possession, method of performance, and title 
to be conveyed and all of these by clear and convincing 
evidence. None of these. factors were shown and even if 
referred to, fe-11 far below the standard required. 
PART II: PART PERFORMANCE. 
1. Assuming, however, a finding by clear and con-
vincing evidence that an oral contract existed; Ryan as 
Plaintiff must also prove by clear and unequivocal evidence 
that he has-performed under the contract to the extent that 
his acts of performance (1) "are clearly referrable to 
[the] contract existing between the parties in relation to 
the subject matter in dispute;" and (2) "Plaintiff has 
been defrauded as a result of such acts." Ravarino v. 
Price, supra. 
As provided it 73 AmJur 2d 400, the doctrine of 
part performance operates not upon the theory that the part 
performance is a substitute for the written evidence 
required by the statute of frauds, but on the theory that 
the·J\ppellant may_ be estopped in view of the part performance 
~to assert the statute as a defense. Part performance 
takes the case out of the sta~uteJnot because it furnishes 
proof of the contract or because it makes the contract-· 
any stronger, but because it would be intolerable in 
equity ·for the owner of a tract of land knowingly to 
suffer another to invest time, labor and money in that land 
-9-
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upon good faith of a contract which did not exist. 
The conduct of the Respondent Ryan is not per-
formance under the alleged contract, but acts which were 
reasonably-· referable to and expected of Respondent as a 
co-owner of real p~9pe~ty. 
2. Consider the acts of Respondent Ryan: 
a) Payment: 
Under the part performance rule, payment by the 
buyer in mole or in part is not deemed to be 
sufficient to permit the Court to specifically 
enforce the oral promise to convey, since.he has 
the quasi-contractual remedy of recovering back 
what he has pafa; Contracts by John D. Calamari 
and Joseph N. Perillo, West Publishing Company, 
1970, pp 465. See also 2 Corbin Section 419; 
Restatement, contracts (2nd) Section 197, 
comment c. 
RE:!_spondent-Ryan alleges that payment was tendered 
in the form of checks.and a mortgage payoff. The evidence 
overwhelmingly establishes that the checks were not accepted 
by Appellant Earl and were never negotiated. Additionaly, 
the first check was subsequently voided and the first and 
second checks (Exhibits 3 and 4) were written on deficit 
balance accounts. The loan repayment was not contemplated, 
requested, or authorized by Appellant-Earl. In fact 
Appellant-Earl liquidated the mortgage obligation in order 
to clear title to the land of which he was co-owner, in 
anticipation of financing his home construction--not to make 
... 
performance under contract to purchase. The benefit of clear 
title inures to both parties as co-tenants of the realty. 
·This Court in Maxfield v. West, 6 Ut 327, 23 
P 754 (1890) held that the fact that a part of the purchase 
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price has not been paid was not itself sufficient in 
equity to take a parole contract out of the statute of 
frauds. 
b) Possession: While __ :Respondent-Ryan claims 
exclusive possession of the subject property, no evidence 
, ' , ~ 
exists to sust~in tha~~position. On the contrary, by 
Respondent.' s own admis~ion Appellant-Eaf_l was on .the 
premises on "numerous occasions" (TR pp· 150, 153). It is 
also uncontroverted tha.t Appe~lant continued to use the 
premises for storage and even now has possessions '.at.the 
building on the subject prope~ty (TR pp 238-240). It is 
also agreed by the parties that Appellant purchased his 
interest in the subject property primarily as an investment. 
His possession has always existed if in no other manner, 
from his mere holding the same for investment and appreciation. 
The law in Utah, as wel.l as most jurisdictions, 
is well established that since possession o·f· land by a· 
tenant in common inures to the benefit of all co-tenants, 
such possession under a parole contract of sale from his 
co-tenants is not a sufficient part performance to take 
the contract out of the operation of the statute of frauds. 
Possession by a tenant in common is presumed to be in favor 
of and for the benefit of his co-tenants and in order .. for 
his possession to take an oral contract of sale to him by 
his co-tenants out of statute, it must show his individual 
right in the pre~ises to the exclusion of the other co-
tenants. (See 73 ArnJur 2nd 421). 
-11-
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It is to be noted that possession by the Plaintiff 
is regarded as.an important fact, on which is 
generally directly referrable to the contract, and 
when combined with permanent and valuable improve-
ments which are representative of the existance 
of an oral contract, virtually every jurisdiction 
will grant specific performance. The same limitation 
of course, if placed on the Plaintiff's possession 
as is found when improvements are relied upon: 
It must be of such a nature that it would not have 
been given without the presence of an oral contract 
to convey. Ravarion v. Price, supra (Emphasis added) 
Appellant submits that Respondent-Ryan's 
possession was not exclusive but jointly exercised with 
_Appellant. Respondent's possession and installation of 
improvements is not exclusively-referable to the alleged 
contract, but soley to Respondent's status as a co-tenant. 
c) Improvements: It must be remembered that 
Earl was aware of the persistant and anxious desire of 
Respondent to build a home on the subject property. 
With this in mind and because of other pressures exerted 
upon the Appellant at the time, it was Earl who suggested 
that Responde~t purchase Mr. Har;rey' s one-half interest 
and that they (Appellant and Respondent) then enter into a 
written agreement to define property ownership. Appellant 
did not then, and does not now, object to Ryan's construction 
of a home: however, the construction of the home as 
well as all other improvements made by Ryan are not 
"exclusively referrable" to the alleged contract. 
The improvements must be of a kind which would 
naturally and reasonably be done under a contract 
so as to indicate the existance of a contract to 
account for them;· they must be made on the fact 
of the contract and must of course be subsequent 
to it ... this court must be convinced that no 
-12-
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reasonable doubt exists as to whether or not 
the acts of improvement are explainable on some 
basis other than on the hypothesis of an oral 
contract. The reason for this rule is well 
established in the common experience of mankind 
to which the enactment of the statute of frauds 
bears witness: the possibility of fraud and 
uncertainty in oral promises to convey realty makes 
it encumbant upon the court to be hesitant in 
applying a general acception to diverse factual 
situations, While the fundamental basis of the 
doctrine of part performance is to prevent fraud, 
historical precedent has drawn the line where 
evidentiary facts are not sufficient to show an 
oral contract was made. Ravarino v. Price, supra 
(Emphasis added). 
Ordinarily the courts hold that activities, 
improvements and possession by one co-tenant is for the 
benefit of all co-tenants and not adverse to them. Summary 
of Utah Real Property Law, Brigham Young University Legal 
Stidies, J. Ruben Clark Law School, Vol. 1, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.24, pp 125. 
The ... fact that extensive improvements were made 
while appellant was living on the property are also not 
inconsistent with co-tenancy. As this Court stated in Sperry 
v. Tolley, 114 Ut 303, 199 P2d 542 (1948) 
.•• It is likewise true that the repairs and 
improvements made in dwellings buildings and fences 
are acts normally consistent with a tenancy in 
common and not adverse to it. 
In the instant case the repairs and improvements 
were such as a person in possession would make for 
one's own convenience and satisfaction and would 
not necessarily show an intent to oust co-tenants 
of their rights or rebut the presumption that they 
were made for the benefit of all co-tenants. 
Heiselt v. Heiselt, 10 Ut. 2nd 126, 249 P2d 178 
(1960) 
SUMMARY 
It is the Respondent in this case who bears the 
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that 
-13-
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(1) an oral contract was createa ana- \Z-/ 'Crn::A.-c :::H.4.;_.;,,...;..~_;,_.:::nt 
performance or conduct was made on the part of the Respondent 
which exclusively relates to the alleged contract to exempt 
it from the effect of the statute of frauds. 
It is readily apparent that the evidence before the 
Court does not support a finding that a contract clearly 
existed or that there has been performance under such a 
contract sufficient to obivate the intent and purpose of 
the Statute of Frauds. Extreme caution is to be exercised 
in granting such performance unless clearly part performance 
has occurred. 
The doctrine [of part performance] is to be applied 
with great care paying particular attention to the 
policy expressed in the Statute of Frauds and the 
historical precident where the limits have been 
defined by process of inclusion and exclusion. 
Price v. Lloyd, supra 
Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine 
invoked by Plaintiff, have not, by any means, 
intended to annul the statute of frauds, but only 
to prevent its being made the means of perpertrating 
a fraud. In order that a Plaintiff might be per-
mitted to-- give evidence o-f a contract in writing, 
and which is in the very teeth of the statute and 
nullity at law, it is essential that he establish 
[in equity] by clear and positive proof, acts and 
things done in pursuance and on account thereof, 
exclusively referrable thereto and which take it 
out of the operation of the statute. 
The doctrine, in its broadest scope, is that acts 
will constitute sufficient part performance if they 
are clearly referrable to some contract existing 
between the parties in relation to the subject 
matter in dispute, and as a result of these acts, 
th~ Plaintiff has been defrauded. Ravarino v. Price, 
supra 
Appellant submits that no contract was ever entered 
into. All Respondents offers were rejected. But Respondenti, 
not to be frustrated, attempted to fabricate a contract in 
order to obtain Appellant's interest in the property. 
Appellant resists Respondent's efforts to unilaterally 
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) ' ) '. 1_ • 
impose an obligation upon the Appellant to sell. Appellant 
has at no time intended to part with his property. 
Equity demands in this case that Appellant not be deprived 
of his property. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing the Court should reverse 
the decision of.~he Lower Court and remand the case for 
a hearing and judgment to equitably partition the subject 
property. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of March, 1980. 
& JENKINS 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief was mailed, 
post paid, to Plaintiffs-Respondents Attorney, B. 
H. Harris at 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah 84321 
this 2_/ji4ray of March, 1980. 
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